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Abstract— The advancement in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs)
has created an enormous market for the development of self-
driving functionalities, raising the question of how it will
transform the traditional vehicle development process. One
adventurous proposal is to open the AV platform to third-party
developers, so that AV functionalities can be developed in a
crowd-sourcing way, which could provide tangible benefits to
both automakers and end users. Some pioneering companies
in the automotive industry have made the move to open the
platform so that developers are allowed to test their code on the
road. Such openness, however, brings serious security and safety
issues by allowing untrusted code to run on the vehicle. In this
paper, we introduce the concept of an Appified AV platform that
opens the development framework to third-party developers. To
further address the safety challenges, we propose an enhanced
appified AV design schema called AVGUARD, which focuses
primarily on mitigating the threats brought about by untrusted
code, leveraging theory in the vehicle evaluation field, and
conducting program analysis techniques in the cybersecurity
area. Our study provides guidelines and suggested practice for
the future design of open AV platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appified platforms, where software applications (apps)
are developed in a crowd-sourcing manner by third party
developers and distributed through the app market, have
achieved astonishing success in the IT field in the last decade
due to the benefits accrued from its open nature. Taking the
smartphone industry as an example, we can see that it took
only four years for the appified platforms – iOS and Android,
which provide an unprecedented rich set of functionalities
to users through their app stores – to win 91.1% of the
market share since their birth in 2008 [20]. Recent years
have seen the appification of many other software platforms
such as the smart home [13], network switches [5], and even
drones [3]. Yet the success that has been achieved through
the crowd-sourcing app development on these platforms has
raised concerns in both industry and academia about whether
the autonomous vehicle (AV) – the next much-anticipated
software platform – will become appified.
Supporting crowd-sourcing app development on AV is
presumed to benefit both automakers and customers. From
the end-user’s perspective, it will bring a vast variety of
apps into the market that enriches users’ choices, providing
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Fig. 1. The open-access automated vehicle of at the University of Michigan
Fig. 2. Traditional physical CAN bus vehicle platform
them with the flexibility to personalize their driving and in-
vehicle experience just by installing/uninstalling apps. For
the automakers, appification will transform the development
of some AV functionalities from outsourcing to crowd-
sourcing, which not only reduces the cost, but also promotes
the improvement of app quality. The AV app market will
also create an ecosystem where multiple functionalities can
work together to provide greater intelligence and conve-
nience. Some organizations have already begun to roll out
the autonomous vehicle with open development support.
For example, in the industry, vehicle middleware platforms
that open massive vehicle functionalities, including steering
wheel and brake to the developers have been built (e.g.,
Ford OpenXC [11], PolySync [12]). While in the academia,
University of Michigan (U-M) starts to offer open-access
to their testing AV equipped with sensors, including lidar,
radar, and cameras, so that researchers can rapidly test their
self-driving or connected-vehicle technologies [15] (Fig. 1).
Although these initiators have yet to discuss the idea of “AV
app store”, to better realize the benefit of crowd-sourcing
development, there are reasons to believe that appified an
AV platform will become a reality in the near future.
There are two sides to every coin, however. To identify
key challenges and issues for the appified AV, we compare
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Fig. 3. Example of the appified AV architecture
aspects of the traditional vehicle platform with an appified
AV platform. As can be seen in Fig. 2, from the adoption
of the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus in the 1980s,
modern vehicles now have over 70 electronic control units
(ECUs) for various subsystems [16], including critical con-
trol systems and also peripheral infotainment systems all
communicate using the CAN bus. As automakers usually
outsource the development of these peripheral functionalities
to reduce development costs, security and safety problems
arise,as software developed by a third-party with access to
CAN bus, can potentially be exploited to tamper the safety
of the vehicle [1], [24]. The appified AV platform shown in
Fig. 3 provides software abstraction for the physical CAN
bus. Self-driving functionalities are developed as apps, and
their interactions with the hardware actuators are proxied by
a vehicle operating system that also acts as the middleware.
Since the appified platform opens full-fledged self-driving
functionalities to the third party developers, it could poten-
tially introduce greater safety risk. For example, flaws in
the proportional control algorithms of a cruise control app
may put the vehicle in a situation where a collision becomes
inevitable. Recent accident records [6] of self-driving cars
suggest that deficiencies in the AV software are inevitable
due to the complexity of the physical environment, thus
rendering the vulnerable apps a persistent threat to the AV
industry. Apps may also be developed for malicious purposes
to tamper with the user’s safety with embedded malicious
logic [2].
Fortunately, the open nature of the appified AV platform
also provides us with opportunities to build and deploy
defenses against these potential threats at the vehicle OS
level. Thus, sanity checks can be performed on the control
messages from AV apps to mitigate potential risks raised by
apps and guard the safety of the vehicle. However, due to
the extremely high safety requirement of the vehicle platform
compared with other appified platforms, dangerous apps that
include fatal design and implementation flaws or malicious
logic should really be detected even before being installed
on the vehicle. The best practices that have already achieved
success on appified platforms are building market-level app
vetting to prevent problematic apps from entering the market.
We draw lessons from state-of-the-art security practices in
the IT field, and leverage the open AV platform to propose
our solution to the above mentioned problem.
In this paper, we propose the first appified AV design
scheme that focuses mainly on addressing security and
safety concerns raised by crowd-sourcing app development.
We identify key principles that need to be enforced in
the context of various self-driving scenarios, and propose
AVGUARD, which is a platform enhancement for open AV
that incorporates (1) offline app vetting which performs early
detection of unsafe apps, and (2) runtime safe guardian which
provides a baseline safety guarantee. We present the detailed
design of the app vetting process, which adapts the program
analysis techniques from cybersecurity fields to perform
static app analysis, and leverages recent advancements in
the Accelerated Evaluation field to dynamically estimate
the risks of apps using naturalistic traces. The vetting also
enforces many principles proposed recently in the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s Federal Automated Vehicles
Policy [25], such as requirements for the fall-back approach
and the specification of allowable circumstances. We also
advocate a runtime on-vehicle watchdog implemented as
a privileged process on the vehicle OS that monitors the
surrounding environment to avoid potential collisions caused
by apps. Our study sheds light on the opportunity of realizing
the benefits of crowd-sourcing development on self-driving
vehicles without risking the safety of the platform, and
provides guidelines for future research along this line.
II. THE AVGUARD APPROACH
In this section, we first describe the scope of the problem
, and discuss the essential steps to mitigate them. We then
introduce the major components of the AVGUARD approach,
and present a roadmap for the detailed design of each
component.
As mentioned earlier, the major safety issue with appified
AV comes from the untrusted third-party app. In this paper,
we focus mainly on two types of untrusted apps – vulnerable
app and malicious app, which have been consistently pre-
sented difficulties for other appified platforms. A vulnerable
app is one that contains flaws that may either cause damage
directly to vehicle functionality or expose vulnerabilities that
can be leveraged by an adversary. In addition to the com-
plexity of self-driving functionalities, these mistakes may
also be made due to inexperienced or careless developers. In
contrast, a malicious app (malware) is one that intentionally
tampers with the user’s safety or privacy with malicious
logic embedded in the apps. For example, malware may
be disguised as a normal AV app, and block certain critical
functionalities while the user is driving unless a ransom is
paid. In some cases, the erroneous or malicious logic can be
identified offline by analyzing the app’s code, thus preventing
suspicious apps from entering the market. The problem of
some apps, however, is that they may be revealed only in
certain roadside or environmental conditions, which would
not be able to be identified statically.
Fig. 4. System overview
As shown in Figure 4, we advocate the AVGUARD ap-
proach, which consists of four components: (1) A standard-
ized app development process to be provided by the devel-
oper that specifies required information on the properties of
the self-driving app (e.g., source code, allowable circum-
stances), in order to make the app functionality expressive
and verifiable (§III); (2) A static app vetting framework that
checks app logic against a set of safety principles based
on static program analysis techniques (§IV); (3) A dynamic
risk evaluation system that tests the app in a simulated
environment against a set of benchmarks and naturalistic
driving traces to quantify potential risk (§V), with only apps
that pass both static and dynamic vetting being allowed to
enter the market. The official app market should be the only
authenticated source from which users should be allowed
to download AV apps. Authenticity can be enforced by
requiring the installation of a digital signature for each app,
with only app binaries signed by the official market being
allowed to run on the consumer’s vehicle; and (4) A runtime
guardian system that performs access control for AV apps
running on the vehicle based on the environmental context,
and ensures the baseline safety of the vehicle under a variety
of physical scenarios (§VI). We then discuss details about
of implementation of AVGUARD in §VII, and conclude our
work in §VIII.
III. STANDARDIZED AV APP DEVELOPMENT
Existing appified platforms require app developers to pro-
vide a specification or statement about the security sensitive
capabilities app demands[14]. For example, in the appified
smartphone platform with dominating market share, Android,
each app’s code base is required to provide a manifest
file that lists the requested capabilities, such as reading
and sending text messages. Such explicit specifications have
already been shown in previous work in both academia and
industry to greatly benefit the app vetting process, that is,
by efficiently identifying malicious apps that masquerade as
benign apps on the app market [21], [4].
Applying from the design of existing appified platforms
to AVGUARD, we require that the developers of AV apps
explicitly provide essential information to facilitate the app
vetting process (detailed later in §IV and §V) and determine
that the app behaviors conform to user expectations. Adapt-
ing previous design to the context of autonomous vehicle
control, our preliminary design of the app specifications
in AVGUARD includes three types of information: required
resources, purpose statement, and usage constraints. Re-
quired resources are entries that specify the security or safety
sensitive of in-vehicle resources the app needs to access.
Examples of such resources include sensing devices such
as radar, controlling devices such as wheels and throttle
pedals, and also platform level resources such as networking,
storage.
In addition to the list of resources requested, we also
require that the developers specify why these resources are
requested in the purpose statement entries. In AV systems,
the granting of access to certain resources is ultimately an
end user decision, thus providing more detailed explanations
for access to sensitive resources which can greatly help users
make better decisions. In our preliminary design, there are
two types of purpose statement entries: (1) App-level purpose
statement answering the question as to what the app is used
for, which makes it easier for users to choose the desired
app; and (2) Resource-level purpose statement clarifying why
certain resources (e.g., control of brake, speed of vehicle)
are required, which can help permission – granting decisions
and also enable early detection of potential resource usage
conflicts in the vetting process.
In AVGUARD, developers are also required to specify
usage constraints for each resource usage request. Due to
the uncertainty of real-world road conditions, the apps in
AV systems are usually designed for special/strict usage
conditions, e.g., highway only, sunny day only (with clear
camera vision). Thus, to provide safety guarantees, each
app in AVGUARD must specify allowable circumstances for
the usage of the app itself. This requirement is unique for
the autonomous vehicle domain, and is also listed in the
DoT’s federal automated vehicle policy. In addition to the
app-level allowable circumstances, we also ask developers
to specify resource level usage constraints. For example, a
cruise control app may need to specify an exclusive usage
requirement of the steering wheel to ensure functionality
correctness.
Listing 1 is the code snippet of a working self-driving
Listing 1. Code snippet of a working path following app
1 class PathFollowingNode
2 {
3 //App is a node on Virtual CAN bus
4 List<Position> map;
5 public PathFollowingNode(){
6 //Subscribe on the vehicle report
7 registerListener( VEHICLE );
8 //Load the trajectory data
9 map = loadMap("map.dat");
10 }
11 //When vehicle report message is received
12 void messageEvent (Message msg)
13 {
14 float _distErr;
15 float _headingErr;
16
17 for (long i=startNum; i<map.length(); i++)
18 { //Calculate distance error and heading
error referring to the path
19 _distErr = sqrt(pow(msg.position.x-map[i
].x,2)+
20 pow(msg.position.y-map[i].y, 2));
21 _headingErr = abs(msg.position.heading-
map[i].heading);
22
23 Message message = new Message();
24 if(_distErr<MAX_DIST_ERR && _headingErr<
MAX_HEADING_ERR){
25 //If vehicle in path, continue with the
adjusted steering angle
26 float _angel = CalcSteeringAngel(msg);
27 message.setSteeringAngel(_angel);
28 //Publish message on virtual CAN
29 message.publish();
30 }
31 else{
32 //If vehicle not in path, perform stop
with the maximum throttle gain
33 message.setThrottleCommand(100);
34 message.publish()
35 break;
36 }
37 }
38 }
39 }
app developed by a U-M researcher that implements the path
following functionality for the AV and enables the vehicle
to drive following a given set of coordinates. We use it as
a running example to help understand our approach in the
rest of the paper. For this app, the required resource part
of the app specification needs to include the prerequisite to
subscribe to the vehicle state message, in order to access
vehicle speed and heading angle. It also needs to specify its
demand to control the steering wheel and the throttle. The
purpose statement can explain that the app-level purpose is to
provide trajectory following and the resource-level purpose
is to monitor the vehicle state update, and to perform the
steering wheel angle adjustment and emergency stop for
the steering and throttle access. Since this app is designed
to follow only a given path, its app-level usage constraint
is to be used only in the proprietary test facility (e.g.,
Mcity [9]), where traffic is under control, and its resource-
level constraint can be having exclusive use of the steering
wheel and throttle access.
Fig. 5. Static analysis overview
In our design, these specifications provided by developers
must required to be written in a certain language or for-
mat to facilitate automated processing. Extensible Markup
Language (XML) is one recommended format that can be
used to write specifications that are both human-readable and
machine-readable [8]. The standardization not only helps the
app vetting process to identify malicious or vulnerable apps,
but also enables early detection of app-level and resource-
level conflicts. It will also make it easier for users to choose
the desired app.
IV. STATIC APP VETTING
Static program analysis is a software engineering method
that leverages standard a program language techniques to
automatically examine the source code of a program to check
a set of pre-defined code properties [28]. In existing appified
platforms, this technique has already been demonstrated to
be effective in checking a wide range of security related
properties, including malicious app behaviors such as mali-
cious code execution and information leakage, and also app
vulnerabilities such as vulnerable API usage [19], [18], [27].
For example, static analysis on AV apps is able to identify
a potentially malicious infotainment app if it contains logic
for publishing a steering wheel control message in the code.
In AVGUARD, we use static analysis as the first step in our
vetting process. Fig. IV shows an overview of the analysis
procedure. It first converts the AV app’s source code written
in a particular programming language to an Intermediate
Representation (IR) [7] that can be automatically processed
by state-of-the-art programming analysis approaches. The
code properties our system is designed to check for include
(1) known security sensitive properties, e.g., the buffer over-
flow vulnerability in C programs; (2) known malicious code
patterns such as collecting user privacy data (e.g., location)
and sending it to suspicious hosts, (3) consistency with the
specifications submitted by the developer together with the
source code ; and (4) safety sensitive properties specific to
the AV platform. For the latter, our system derives such
properties from multiple sources, including, but not limited
to:
• Existing rules applied to commodity vehicle compo-
nents. Protocols such as MirrorLink [10] have already
brought the concept of isolation to the infotainment
module of the vehicle, and these rules will also be
enforced on the appified platform.
• Traffic rules. Will by default be enforced by the
platform, so that violations in the app logic, such as
not reacting to a red light, can be detected.
• General cybersecurity policies. Protecting the privacy
of the app user is one example of such cybersecurity
policies. Unauthorized access and transmission of sen-
sitive in-vehicle information, such as location and user’s
profile, will be disallowed.
• Other vehicle-specific rules. Some principles that seem
to be common sense for human drivers may be violated
in the appified era. For example, whether the gear has
been shifted to ’Park’ before turning of the engine can
be verified from the app code.
• AV industry standard. Although the AV industry
is still immature, with few published regulations. We
expect industry standards to be formalized in the near
future, with every app written for AV being checked
against these standards.
Checking these properties is greatly facilitated by the spec-
ifications provided by the app developer in the app package
as described in § III. The static analysis engine automatically
processes the app’s purpose, scope and required resources in
the specification. Program techniques are then used to realize
the app vetting process, e.g., checking the conformation of
the app’s declared purpose and the actual implemented logic
for malicious app detection.
V. DYNAMIC APP VETTING
Static app vetting is effective for checking the app logic
with invariant principles by ensuring perfect code coverage in
the analysis. Some potential risks may not be revealed, how-
ever, until the vehicle encounters certain physical roadside
conditions. Using the same path following app as an example
(Listing 1), the vehicle status of running the app is plotted
in Fig. 6. The automated vehicle successfully followed the
trajectory when the acceleration and curvature were small
(point 2), but lost control when the desired yaw rate was
high (point 3). The vehicle completely lost stability at point
4 where the driver needed to take over to avoid a collision.
Dynamic analysis bridges the gap by testing the program
ideally in all the scenarios for which it is designed to detect
any potential violation of security and safety principles that
need to be upheld under any circumstance.
Dynamic analysis has achieved great success in detecting
malicious and vulnerable apps on other appified platforms
by eliminating the need to artificially create situations likely
to produce errors. However, the known limitation is that it
functions only as well as the principles used against which
the code is being checked. Due to the complexity of the
physical conditions in the self-driving scenarios compared, it
virtually impossible to exhaustively list the safety principles
suitable for individual scenarios [17], [26]. We turn now to
build a metric that can quantitatively evaluate the safety of
a given AV app.
Naturalistic Field Operational Tests (N-FOTs) have been
used to evaluate AVs with data collected from a number
of equipped vehicles driven in naturalistic conditions [22].
(a) Desired and measured
trajectories
(b) vehicles states (longitudinal speed, yaw rate,
steering angle)
Fig. 6. Example of improper dynamic controller that led to out-of-control
failure
Challenges that arise, however, when applying N-FOTs on an
appified AV are: (1) it is too time consuming to thoroughly
test each app, since critical conditions that likely lead to
a crash are exceedingly rare in naturalistic traces, and (2)
it still requires the app to be installed and tested on a
real vehicle, which risks property and is not scalable for
performing market-level vetting. We therefore advocate a
simulation-based dynamic app vetting process that leverages
a technique we call Accelerated Evaluation [29], [30], [23],
which consists of both the modeling aspect from data and
the simulation algorithmic design. The procedure begins
with calibrating the AV control dynamics and model-fitting
the surrounding stochastic environment using naturalistic
driving data from the naturalistic driving database. Once
the distributions governing these stochastic elements are
identified, the Importance Sampling method is applied, which
entails finding a skewed distribution to artificially boost the
hit rate of the rare event. Finding a good skewed distribution
is conducted via adaptive searching method that sequentially
optimizes the parameters in the candidate set of parametric
distributions. (See Fig. 7 for a pictorial outline of the
procedure.)
The dynamic app vetting of AVGUARD is also performed
off-the-vehicle, and aims at quantifying the potential risks
of AV apps. Submitted apps whose probability of a crash
in the trace-driven test exceed a certain threshold will be
rejected. The simulation is performed by running the vehicle
OS on a commodity server with naturalistic data feeding
into the virtual CAN bus of the OS. Apps to be evaluated
run on the “simulated vehicle” as if they were interacting
with a real vehicle, read sensor data from the recorded
trace, and send control messages to the virtual CAN. The
vehicle OS simulates the app control on the current virtual
environment, and adjusts the simulated sensor date to reflect
the post-control environment. Thus, full-fledged self-driving
functionalities of the app can be tested before installation on
the real vehicle. As most of the existing vehicle OS are built
based on the Robot Operating System (ROS), which runs on
commodity computers, the effort of to build the simulation
can be greatly reduced.
Accelerated Evaluation statistically models the driving
Fig. 7. Accelerated Evaluation overview
behaviors reflected in the naturalistic trace, and compresses
the non-safety-critical events to reduce the required test
mileage for crash analysis by a factor of 10,000 to 100,000.
Leveraging Accelerated Evaluation to statistically tailor the
collected trace, the simulation can efficiently give the proba-
bility of a crash for a given app in the trace-driven simulation
equivalent to an expanded driving test. Note that based on
the allowable circumstances specified by the app, different
sets of naturalistic trace will be used. For example, a cruise
control app designed specifically for highway driving will
be tested solely against highway traces extracted from the
dataset. In addition to naturalistic traces, the compound
approach combining static and dynamic vetting prevents
threats of untrusted apps from entering the market.
VI. ON-VEHICLE RUNTIME WATCHDOG
Even with static and dynamic app analysis, safety is not
guaranteed under all circumstances, as chances still exist that
some rare scenarios may be missing in the naturalistic trace.
Moreover, interactions among different installed AV apps at
runtime are also not covered by the analysis, and potential
conflict in different app logic may lead to an accident. We
maintain that an on-vehicle safety watchdog is essential for
providing baseline safety guarantees.
The proposed watchdog runs as a high-privileged process
on the vehicle and can intercept AV apps’ control messages
and decline/override them. As shown in Fig. 4, the watchdog
process senses the surroundings and the roadside conditions
of the vehicle, and runs a basic collision avoidance algorithm.
When it detects a potential collision caused by the self-
driving app, it performs simple emergency reactions such
as emergent stop or staying in lane to avoid collision;
further commands issued by the apps will then be invalided.
Note that different from other self-driving functionalities, the
watchdog process provides a fail-safe mechanism only in
unexpected roadside conditions that provides safety based on
the sensing of the physical environment. The code base of the
watchdog process implementation should be small, and the
safety and reliability of the algorithm should be verifiable.
VII. DEPLOYMENT DISCUSSION
The platform we are targeting for prototyping the
AVGUARD is a Lincoln MKZ equipped with PolySync
middleware and a rich set of sensing and GPS devices
including Mobileye and PointGrey cameras, Velodyne and
IBEO Lidars, OTXS RTK GPS. To help other teams at the
University test their control algorithms designed for self-
driving cars on the road, we allow researchers to develop
their own apps and test them on the vehicle.
AVGUARD satisfies the growing demands of opening the
platform while preserving safety, even under the threat of po-
tentially flawed or dangerous apps developed by students. We
are also rolling out a standardized app development platform
for all potential researchers interested in development on the
AV which requires that the apps first be submitted in the
source code format to our web-based vetting system. Only
those apps that have passed the vetting will be compiled to
executable binaries by the server and installed automatically
on the real vehicle. The platform is also expected to be used
in the upcoming UM course on Connected and Automated
Vehicle in the fall of 2017 as an educational platform for
students to safely test their self-driving algorithms on the
road.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We present the design of AVGUARD, which leverages
state-of-the-art program analysis techniques and accelerated
vehicle evaluation theory, integrating both to mitigate the
security and safety challenges of running untrusted code
on an open AV platform. Our approach is one solution
to the challenge of realizing the functionality benefit of
crowd-sourcing development in the arena of self-driving
cars, without risking safety, and it is closely aligned to the
increasing demand for self-driving car apps. We feel that
AVGUARD provides guidelines for the future design of open
AV, and as our future work, we will prototype it on our
AV platform to enable the crowd-sourcing development in
multiple scenarios.
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